Abstract: This paper studies mean field games for multi-agent systems with control-dependent multiplicative noises. For the general systems with nonuniform agents, we obtain a set of decentralized strategies by solving an auxiliary limiting optimal control problem subject to consistent mean field approximations. The set of decentralized strategies is further shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. For the integrator multiagent systems, we design a set of ε-Nash strategies by exploiting the convexity property of the limiting problem. It is shown that under the mild conditions all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
Introduction
The methodology of mean field games was proposed to investigate decentralized strategies in large population dynamic games [11] , [12] , [13] , [16] ; it is effective to design asymptotic Nash equilibria for many players which are individually negligible but collectively affect a particular player. By identifying a consistency relationship between the individual's optimal response and the population macroscopic behavior, one may obtain a fixed-point equation to specify the mean field effect. This procedure leads to a set of decentralized strategies as an ε-Nash equilibrium for the actual model with large population. For some aspects of mean field games, the readers are referred to the linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) framework [11] , [12] , [30] , [24] , [34] , mean field games with a major player [2] , [10] , [33] , [36] , the nonlinear mean field games [4] , [13] , oblivious equilibria for large-scale Markov decision processes [38] , and mean field games with Markov jump parameters [34] , [35] . For the survey on mean field games, see, e.g., [2] , [7] , and [3] .
Concerned with mean field games for stochastic systems, most existing literature focuses on the case with additive noise, namely, the intensity of noise is independent of the system state. Sometimes, such kind of noises is not sufficient to model the practical situations. Alternatively, multiplicative noise is another realistic description for uncertainty; in this case, the noise intensity depends on the system state. Stochastic systems with multiplicative noises have been extensively studied in the past half century in the control and mathematical communities. From the viewpoint of mathematics, almost all the theories about stochastic differential equations (SDEs, for short) are for the case with multiplicative noises, and there are lots of practical motivations to study such kinds of SDEs [27] . The study in control community is also popular; to mention a few, see monographs [6] , [39] and some recent papers on stochastic control [40] , [41] .
In particular, some researchers have paid attention to multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises, that is, the intensity of noise depends on agents' states. Multiplicative noises in multi-agent systems can be generated by data transmission channels, during the propagation of radio signals or under signal processing by receivers or detectors [37] . In [23] , the authors investigated the consensus problems for the continuous-time systems with multiplicative noises and the noise intensities are proportional to the absolute value of the relative states of agents and their neighbors. Then this work was extended to the discrete-time version in [21] . Further, the work [19] studied the distributed consensus with the general multiplicative noises and developed some small consensus gain theorems to give sufficient conditions for mean square and almost sure consensus under undirected topologies. Moreover, the authors in [42] investigated stochastic consentability of linear multi-agent systems with time delays and multiplicative noises; and [43] developed the consensus conditions of continuous-time multi-agent systems with additive and multiplicative measurement noises. Note that the methodology of handling the multiplicative noises of multi-agent systems is different from the stochastic-approximation-type algorithms [14] , [18] , [32] , which are powerful tools to deal with multi-agent systems with additive noisy measurements.
Due to its wide popularity and practical applications [5, 8, 15] , multiplicative noise should be taken care of when considering mean field games, which is the theme of this paper. An LQ mean field game with multiplicative noises is introduced in Section 2, where the diffusion terms include both the state and the control variables. Due to the appearance of multiplicative noise, the strategy design and analysis of this LQ mean field game is not a trivial extension of those with additive noises [40] , [20] . For instance, a stochastic linear system with additive noise cannot attain asymptotic stability (in the normal sense), while a stochastic system with multiplicative noise could be asymptotically stable. Furthermore, the optimal control law for a stochastic system with additive noise and a quadratic cost is no longer optimal for the case with multiplicative noise. Indeed, research on stochastic systems with additive noise shares similar methods and results to deterministic systems. In contrast, it is more complicate to study stochastic control with multiplicative noise, particularly with control-dependent noise (e.g., stochastic maximum principle) [39] . In Section 3, we start by solving an auxiliary limiting optimal control problem and next construct an equation system of mean field effect by the consistent mean field approximation. For the case of the uniform agents, the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the solution to the consistency equations are obtained. With the help of the mean field effect and the solution to the limiting problem, we design a set of decentralized strategies, which is further shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4, we investigate single-and multiple-integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. The dynamics of each agent is a integrator system with control-dependent multiplicative noise, and the control weight in the cost function is not limited to be positive. By exploiting the coercivity property of the limiting problem, the proposed strategies is proved to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. Particularly, we give the explicit conditions to ensure all the agents achieve mean-square consensus. The closely related works [25] , [26] investigated the consensus problem for single-integrator systems with additive noises from the optimization principle, and under the proposed strategies the mean of agents' states asymptotically achieve consensus, whereas the own states of agents can not attach consensus. In Section 5, we give a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed consensus strategies for single-integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. Furthermore, we compare the consensus effect between this model and multi-agent systems with additive noises. It is shown that agents with multiplicative noises can reach consensus, while agents with additive noises do not achieve consensus exactly. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Compared with previous works, the main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows: (i) We study mean field games with control-dependent multiplicative noises and obtain decentralized ε-Nash strategies. Different from the case with additive noise, we adopt the Lyapunov function method to show the uniform stability of closed-loop system, and then obtain the asymptotic equilibrium property of decentralized strategies. (ii) For the case with uniform agents, we give an easy-verified condition to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to consistency equations. (iii) We further investigate (single-and multiple-) integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises, where the control weight in the cost is not limited to be positive. By exploiting the convexity and coercivity properties of the limiting problem, it is shown that the set of decentralized strategies is an ε-Nash equilibrium and all the agents of closed-loop system converge to a constant, which is the limit of the initial state average of all agents as N → ∞.
The following notation will be used throughout this paper. · denotes the Euclidean vector norm or PeronFrobenious matrix norm. For a vector z and a matrix Q, z 2 Q = z T Qz, and Q > 0 (or Q ≥ 0) means that Q is positive definite (or semi-positive definite). C([0, ∞), R n ) is the space of all the n-dimensional continuous functions on [0, ∞), and
For a family of R n -valued random variables {x(λ ), λ ≥ 0}, σ (x(λ ), λ ≤ t) is the σ -algebra generated by the collection of random variables. For two sequences {a n , n = 0, 1, · · · } and {b n , n = 0, 1, · · · }, a n = O(b n ) denotes lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | ≤ c, and a n = o(b n ) denotes lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | = 0. For convenience of presentation, we use c, c 1 , c 2 , · · · to denote generic positive constants, which may vary from place to place.
Problem Formulation
Consider a large population system with N agents. For i = 1, ..., N, agent i evolves according to the following SDE:
where x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ R r are the state and input. The underlying filtered probability space is (Ω, {F t } t≥0 , P), where {F t } t≥0 is a collection of non-decreasing σ -algebras. W i = {W i (t),t ≥ 0} is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion, which is adapted to {F t } t≥0 , and W i , i = 1, ..., N, are assumed to be mutually independent. The matrices A(·), B,C and D are deterministic and have compatible dimensions. Here, the parameters θ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, are to model this population of nonuniform agents. For notational simplicity, the time argument of a process (x i , u i , etc.) is sometimes suppressed, and
The cost function of agent i is given by
where ρ ≥ 0, and Q, R are symmetric matrices with compatible dimensions.
The admissible control set of agent i is given by
where
we introduce the centralized admissible control set:
In this paper, we will study the following problem.
Problem (P). Seek a set of control strategies within U d that minimize J i (u i , u −i ), i = 1, ..., N in a game-theoretic setting. Specifically, find an ε-Nash equilibrium in the decentralized control set U d , where ε → 0 as N → ∞.
For a large population, a natural way of modeling parameters θ 1 , · · · , θ N is to view them as a sequence of observations on the same underlying distribution function such that this sequence exhibits certain statistical properties when N → ∞. For this, assume that
We make the following assumptions:
.., N, are mutually independent and have the same mathematical expectation. Ex i (0) ≡x 0 , and there exists a constant c 0 (independent of N) such that max 1≤i≤N E x i (0) 2 < c 0 . Furthermore, {x i (0), i = 1, ..., N} and {W i , i = 1, ..., N} are independent of each other.
A2)
A(θ ) is a continuous matrix function of θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is a compact subset of R d . There exists a distribution function F(·) such that F N converges weakly to F, i.e., for any bounded continuous function
A3) For any i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the system (2.1) is ρ-stabilizable 1 in the sense that there exists a feedback control 1 A similar definition is ρ-stability. A system
for further results about ρ-stability and ρ-stabilizability. law u i = K i x i such that for any initial state x i (0) ∈ R n , the state of closed-loop system
Remark 2.1. Assumption A3) is necessary. Otherwise, the cost function cannot be finite, to say nothing of the optimal control. A4) could be relaxed. Actually, provided some convexity condition is satisfied, neither R nor Q is limited to be positive definite. For instance, R is allowed to be negative in Section 4. In [31] , Q = 0 −0.5 −0.5 0 is not semi-positive definite. 
By [41, Theorem 3.1], the system (2.1) is exactly detectable if and only if there does not exist nonzero symmetric matrix Z such that
See more equivalent conditions in verifying ρ-stabilizability and exact detectability in [28, 41] .
3 Strategy Design and Analysis
Optimal control for the limiting problem
we have a standard optimal tracking problem.
For a general initial state x i (t) = x i ∈ R n , define the value function
We introduce the HJB equation:
, then the optimal control is given bȳ
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1), we have
This yields
3)
Here, s i (0) and g i (0) are not pre-specified and to be determined by
We now provide a preliminary result for LQ control with multiplicative noise.
For Problem (P1), the following statements hold.
i) The algebraic Riccati equation (3.3) admits a unique semi-positive definite solution, and the closed-loop system
ii) The equation (3.4) admits a unique solution s i ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ), and (3.5) admits a unique solution g i ∈ C ρ ([0, ∞), R).
iii) Problem (P1) admits a unique optimal control
and the optimal cost is given by
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Design of control strategies
Following the standard approach in mean field games [12] , [17] , we construct the consistency equations
, and s θ (0) is to be determined. In the above,x θ is regarded as the expectation of the state given the parameter θ in the individual dynamics. The last equation is due to the consistency requirement for the mean field approximation.
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to (3.8)-(3.10) may be obtained by using fixed-point methods similar to those in [12] and [34] . For further analysis, we make the following assumption.
For a population-size system in Problem (P), we may design the control strategy as follows:
where s i is the solution of equation system (3.8)-(3.10).
The case with uniform agents
In what follows, we consider the consistency equations for the case with uniform agents, namely,
In this case, the equations (3.8)-(3.10) read as
We now give an easy-verified condition to guarantee A5).
Theorem 3.2. Let A3) and A4) hold. If the real part of any eigenvalue of M is not zero (no eigenvalue of M is on the imaginary axis), then (3.12)-(3.13) have a unique solution (s,
Proof. Letting s(t) = Kx(t) + ϕ(t), t ≥ 0, from (3.13) and (3.12) we have
which implies
Since no eigenvalue of M is on the imaginary axis, then by [22] we have that (3.14) admits a unique solution such thatĀ − . We may identify a unique ϕ(0) = 0 such that ϕ(t) ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) and the resulting solution is ϕ = 0. By (3.13), we have (3.15) , which leads to ϕ = 0. Subsequently,x satisfies (3.16). Hence, x =x, which further implies s = s. 2
Asymptotic Nash equilibrium
We first present a lemma on the ρ-stability of the following system
where {W (t),t ≥ 0} is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion. A similar result was given in [29] .
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the system [A,C] is ρ-stable, and E x(0) 2 < ∞. Then, for any f , σ ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) we have
Proof. Since [A,C] is ρ-stable, by the proof of i) of Lemma 3.1 and [9] , there exists a matrix P > 0 such that
Let V (t) = e −ρt x T (t)Px(t). By using Itô's formula, one has
Here λ min (M) is the minimum eigenvalue of M and λ max (P) is the maximum eigenvalue of P. Then for any T > 0, we obtain
Letting T → ∞, this completes the proof. After the strategy (3.11) is applied, the closed-loop dynamics for agent i may be written as follows:
Theorem 3.4. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then for Problem (P) and any N,
Proof. From A5), there exists c 0 > 0 such that E ∞ 0 e −ρt x(t) 2 dt ≤ c 0 . By Schwarz inequality,
By Lemma 3.3 and A1),
This together with (3.11) completes the proof. 2
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.4 shows that the closed-loop system is uniformly ρ-stable. Particularly, when ρ = 0, one can obtain that the closed-loop states of all the agents are asymptotically stable in the mean square sense.
(3.20)
Lemma 3.6. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then we have
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
We now show the set of decentralized strategies is an ε-Nash equilibrium, whose definition is copied from [1, Chapter 4]. Definition 3.7. For a given ε ≥ 0, a set of strategies {u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is called an ε-Nash equilibrium with respect to the set of cost functions {J i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} if for any i = 1, · · · , N,
Theorem 3.8. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then for Problem (P), the set of strategies (û 1 , · · · ,û N ) given by (3.11) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e., ) and ε N is given by (3.20) .
To prove Theorem 3.8, we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.9. Let A1)-A5) hold. Then
23)
Proof of Theorem 3.8. It follows from Lemma 3.9 that
which leads to the conclusion. 2
The integrator systems with multiplicative noise
In this section, we first consider the single-integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noise, and then extend to the multiple-integrator systems.
The model of noisy single integrator
Now consider the degenerate case of (2.1), where x i , u i ,W i ∈ R, A(θ i ) = C = 0 and B = D = Q = 1. In this situation, the dynamics of agent i reduces to
where ρ > 0 and r is allowed to negative.
Problem (P2). For (4.1)-(4.2), find an ε-Nash equilibrium in
We first give a preliminary result about the dynamics (4.1).
Lemma 4.1. For (4.1), there exists a constant c 0 such that
Proof. Denote x i,ρ (t) = e − ρ 2 t x i (t), and u i,ρ (t) = e − ρ 2 t u i (t). It follows from (4.1) that
By Lemma 3.3, we obtain the conclusion of this lemma. 2
Replacing x (N) in (4.1) byx ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R), we have the limiting optimal control problem. . Supposex ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) is given. For Problem (P3), the following statements hold.
i) The algebraic Riccati equation
admits a solution
such that p + r > 0 and the system
is ρ-stable. Here ∆ := (ρr) 2 + 2ρr + 4r + 1.
ii) The optimal control law is uniquely given bȳ
where s ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) is a unique solution to the equation
iii) The optimal cost is given by
where g ∈ C ρ ([0, ∞), R) is a unique solution to the equation
Proof. See Appendix B. 2 Remark 4.3. In Lemma 4.2, the condition r >
is to ensure the convexity of Problem (P3). Note that the right hand is always negative for ρ > 0, which implies that this condition is satisfied necessarily if r > 0.
For Problem (P2), the consistency equations (3.8)-(3.10) reduce to 
Proof. The equations (4.8)-(4.9) can be written as 
2
For a finite-population system in Problem (P2), we may construct the decentralized strategies as follows:
Substituting (4.11) into (4.1), the closed-loop dynamics of agent i can be written as
By Itô's formula, we havê . Under the set of strategies {û i , i = 1, · · · , N} in (4.11), we have
Proof. It follows from (4.12) that
This gives
(4.14)
By (4.3) and (4.4), we have
where ∆ = (ρr) 2 + 2ρr + 4r + 1.
Note that
It can be verified that ∆ > 0 when r >
. By (4.4),
From (4.14) and (4.15), we obtain (4.13). 2
Now we give the result of asymptotic optimality. Denote . Then the set of strategies (û 1 , · · · ,û N ) given by (4.11) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
). Furthermore, the asymptotic optimal cost of agent i is p(Ex 2 i (0) −x 2 0 ).
To show Theorem 4.6, we first provide two lemmas, whose proofs are given in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.7. Assume that A1) holds and r >
. Then there exists δ > 0 and c > 0 such that 
By Lemma 4.8, there exists an integer N 0 and a constant c 2 such that for all N ≥ N 0 ,
which together with Lemma 4.1 gives
Following an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.9, we can obtain the second inequality in (4.16). By Lemma 4.2 and (4.3), the asymptotic optimal cost is given by
This completes the proof. 2
We now show under mild conditions all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
Definition 4.10. In a multi-agent system, all the agents are said to reach the mean-square consensus if there exists a random variable x * such that lim t→∞ E|x i (t) − x * | 2 = 0. Theorem 4.11. For Problem (P2), assume that A1) holds and r > − 1 2(2+ρ) . Then there exist c 1 , c 2 > 0 such that under the set of strategies {û i , i = 1, · · · , N} in (4.11), 18) which imply all the agents achieve mean-square consensus.
If r ≥ 0, then we directly have p > 0 and further obtain (4.18). For the case − 1 2(2+ρ) < r < 0, we first check the sign of p + 2r. By (4.4),
In view of − 1 2(2+ρ) < r < 0, it follows that p > p + r > p + 2r > 0. This together with (4.19) implies (4.18). By A1) and the law of large numbers, we have lim
.
It means that r
. Thus, to achieve mean-square consensus for agents, a tighter condition for r is needed.
The model of noisy multiple integrator
We now extend the above result to the high-dimensional case. Specifically, agent i evolves by 20) and the cost function is given by
where ρ ≥ 0 and R is symmetric.
For this problem, consistency equations (3.12)-(3.13) have the following solution.
Proposition 4.13. Equations (3.12)-(3.13) admit a unique bounded solution (s(t),x(t)) ≡ (−Px 0 ,x 0 ), t ≥ 0.
Proof. Let Π = P + K, where P is the unique stabilizing solution to (3.3) (i.e., a solution such that A − BR −1 B T P − ρ 2 I is Hurwitz) and K is the unique stabilizing solution to (3.14) . Note that A = 0. We have that Π satisfies ρΠ + ΠB(R + D T PD)B T Π = 0. For a finite-population system in the above problem, we may construct the decentralized strategies as follows:
Substituting (4.23) into (4.1), the closed-loop dynamics of agent i can be written as Proof. Note that (4.24) is equivalent to 
Numerical example
In this section, we give a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed consensus strategies for multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. Furthermore, we compare the consensus effect between this case and multi-agent systems with additive noises [25] , [26] . For comparison, we simulate the single-integrator multi-agent system with additive noise. Specifically, the dynamics of agent i is given by
and the cost function is
The parameters r, ρ are taken the same as above and the noise intensity σ is 0.5. The control strategy is designed by the mean field game methodology as in [25] , [26] . The state trajectories of the single-integrator multi-agent systems with additive noise are shown in Figure 3 . It can be seen that the agents do not reach consensus, although they behave similarly. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, mean field games have been studied for multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. By solving an auxiliary limiting optimal control problems subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is obtained, which is shown to be an ε-Nash equilibrium. The result is further applied to the consensus problem for the integrator multi-agent systems with multiplicative noises. It is shown that under mild conditions the agents achieve asymptotic mean-square consensus. For further works, it is of interest to consider mean field games for multi-agent systems with model uncertainty and common noises.
[ A Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.6
Proof of Lemma 3.1. i) Let x i,ρ (t) = e − ρ 2 t x i (t), and u i,ρ (t) = e − ρ 2 t u i (t). From (2.1), we have
By A4) and [41], the equation (3.3) admits a unique semi-positive definite solution, and under the control
Under the controlū
This implies that the real part of any eigenvalue ofĀ i − (ρ/2)I is negative. It follows from (3.4) that
From an argument in [34, Appendix A], we have that s ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) if and only if the initial state s(0) has the following expression
Under this initial condition, we have
Furthermore, using a similar argument as the above, we have g i ∈ C ρ ([0, ∞), R 2 ) if and only if
iii) Applying Itô's formula to e −ρt [x T i (t)P i x i (t) + 2s T i (t)x i (t) + g i (t)], we havē
Thus, (3.7) is the optimal control and the optimal value is
This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Note that {x i (t) −x i (t),t ≥ 0}, i = 1, ..., N, are mutually independent processes with zero mean, wherex i (t) ∆ = Ex i (t) =x θ i (t). We have This completes the proof. 2
